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The aim of the paper is to evaluate fiscal challenges which are facing the Economic and 
Monetary Union countries after four years of monetary union functioning. Then, the author 
formulates conclusions for accession countries which are planning to become members of the 
Economic and Monetary Unions in the near future. The first part of the paper deals with the 
criteria of fiscal stabilization within EMU, their significance and links to economic growth. On the 
one hand, these criteria limit possibilities of using fiscal policy to stabilize economy after 
economic shocks. On the other hand, the fiscal criteria have also a positive influence because of 
the introduction of discipline into the economic policy, which is created by the policy makers who 
often act under the pressure of their political parties. At this point, short- and medium-term 
economic policies and long-term political decisions come into conflict. After four years of EMU 
functioning, the budget deficit and public debt have appeared as challenges again. The selected 
countries discussed are: Portugal, Germany and France. In the case of fiscal stabilization, 
governments of many EMU countries increased the tax burden rather than cut budget expenditure 
to achieve a lower deficit. In Germany, France, Portugal and many other countries governments 
did not implement radical structural reforms of public finance. 
  The new EU member’s countries are facing the necessity of economic adjustment to the 
convergence criteria, and among them - criteria of fiscal stabilization. Experiences of selected 
EMU countries let us conclude that nominal convergence should result from real convergence 
processes. Thus, fiscal stabilization should result from deep changes in the structure of the public 
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1. Fiscal stabilization criteria 
 
Fiscal stabilization criteria were defined in the European Union Treaty in the 
section dealing with the Economic and Monetary Union (see. Art., 103, 104). Protocol 
No 5 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European 
Union
1 specifies the reference values concerning the budget deficit and public debt. The 
ratio between the planned or actual budget deficit to GDP in market prices should not 
exceed 3% whereas the ratio of the public debt to GDP expressed in market prices should 
not be higher than 60%. 
On June 17
th, 1997, the European Council passed the resolution concerning the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The Pact prescribes the principles of the economic policy co-
ordination in the EU countries and lists the requirements which must be met by the 
countries aspiring to join the Economic and Monetary Union.
2  
The Pact strengthened some resolutions included in the European Union Treaty (among 
others in articles 103, 104). The candidate countries are put under an obligation to avoid 
an excessive budget deficit. It was decided that the maximum budget deficit can amount 
to 3% of GDP (reference value). The European Commission was entrusted with the duty 
of the surveillance of particular countries’ budgetary position. Its duty is to compare the 
actual results with the reference value. If the budget deficit in a given country exceeds the 
reference value, the Commission must prepare an appropriate report. The said report is to  
show whether the budget deficit is of a permanent or temporary nature. If the 
Commission comes to the conclusion that the deficit is too high, it must inform the 
European Union Council. The latter is to address appropriate recommendations to the 
country concerned.  If the country concerned fails to meet the set requirements, the 
Council can initiate the following procedures: 
a)  to demand from the said country the publication of additional information 
specified by the Council before emitting treasury bonds; 
b)  to ask the European Bank of Investment for revising their loan policy towards the 
country in question; 
c)  to put the country under an obligation to lodge a non-interest bearing deposit to 
the benefit of the Union in the amount proportional to the reference value surplus 
(this deposit contains a fixed component equal to 0.2 per cent of GDP and a 
variable component equal to one-tenth of the excess of the deficit over the 
reference value of 3 per cent of GDP. There is an upper limit of 0.5 % of GDP in 
respect of any single deposit). This deposit is refundable as soon as the deficit falls 
below 3% of GDP. 
d)  to impose a fine on the country concerned (if after two years the deficit continues 
to be excessive, the said deposit will be converted irreversibly into a fine). 
 
The Pact assumes also a possibility of withdrawing from financial sanctions. It 
can happen only in the case when the deficit to GDP ratio exceeding the prescribed 3% is 
of exceptional and temporary nature and results from exceptional circumstances. Such 
circumstances include the real GDP drop of at least 2%. In the case of an abrupt 
economic downturn, the Council of Europe can excuse the GDP drop of 0.75 to 2% as 
exceptional. 
                                                           
1 See also The Euro and Economic Policy. Legal and Political Texts adopted by the Council of the 
European Union and the European Council. General Secretariat of the Council of The European 
Union, January 1999, pp. 25-77. 
2 See also: The Euro and Economic Policy. Legal and Political Texts adopted by the Council of 
the European Union and the European council. General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union, January 1999, pp. 25-77.   3
What is more, the Council of Europe will monitor the budgetary situation of 
individual Economic and Monetary Union member countries systematically and will 
address recommendations to the Member State concerned as the early warning 
precautions. 
The criterion of fiscal stability was connected with both economic and political 
causes, among others with German interests. 
In the past the EU countries suffered from serious problems with budget deficits 
of structural nature. An increase in budget deficits and public debt led to the crowding out 
effect in private spending on consumption and investment, which, in turn, limited the 
long-term possibilities of economic growth. It accounted also for maintaining a high tax 
burden for the population and corporate sectors. This affected unfavourably the economic 
effectiveness and international competitiveness of economy. Introduction of this criterion 
accelerated the public finance reform in many countries. 
On the other hand, it is worth remembering that introducing the reference value 
of a 3% share of the budget deficit in GDP and a 60% share of public debt in GDP was 
arbitrary and was rooted neither in the economic theory nor in economic practice. These 
values were adopted under the German pressure. Among others, they aimed at  not 
allowing the excessive budget deficits and public debt to raise the interest rates in the 
whole Union. This, however, was detrimental to the countries which had lower interest 
rates at the time the Union was set up. Those countries included, first of all, Germany. 
 
 
2.  Criteria of fiscal stability versus adjustment mechanism and economic growth 
 
The fiscal stability criteria adopted in the Economic and Monetary Union have 
been criticized. The criticism grew together with the emergence of economic recession in 
2001 and problems of some countries in keeping the budgetary deficit below the 
reference value. Some opponents of the Stability and Growth Pact demand its revision. 
The key arguments against the Pact focus on the issue of using  fiscal policy for economic 
stabilization and, in particular, on using fiscal policy for the economic shock absorption 
purposes or reviving economy. They emphasize also that the fiscal stability criteria make 
fiscal policy very rigid, weaken the effect of automatic stabilizers and restrain investment. 
Other objections include: the possibility of exercising the so-called „creative 
accountancy” by governments in order to show a lower than real budget deficit and 
protect the country from possible sanctions.
3  
The above objections concerning fiscal stability criteria can be analyzed in a 
broader context of the fiscal policy role in economy and its effectiveness in stabilizing 
economy and regulating economic processes. 
Fiscal policy in the broadest sense of the word includes the use of different instruments 
for the realization of fiscal and extra-fiscal objectives.  Fiscal objectives mean ensuring 
state budget  and broadly understood public sector revenues and allocating them among 
different State sectors determined by their functions in society and economy. 
Extra-fiscal objectives deal with using fiscal policy instruments (such as the tax 
system, budget spending programs, etc.) for: regulating enterprise and household 
economies, leveling off people’s wealth or social objectives, regional economic 
development, regulating economic situation, changes in the allocation of production 
resources in the sector and spatial systems. 
Fiscal policy can also be treated in a much narrower sense, as the policy of 
regulating the economic situation. In such a case, then, the primary issue will be the use 
of such instruments as taxes and state expenditures (including automatic stabilizers of the 
                                                           
3  See:  [Oręziak L., 2000], [Fitoussi, 2002], [Eijffinger, 2002], [Blinder, 2002].   4
economic situation, that is budget spending programs and progressive tax systems with 
the in-built flexibility allowing to react to GDP changes) in order to stabilize economy 
and stimulate economic growth.  
In practice, fiscal and extra-fiscal objectives of fiscal policy permeate and 
determine each other. The nature of fiscal policy and its scope as well as proportions 
between fiscal and extra-fiscal objectives depend on political options and related to them 
concepts of the state and its functions in economy. 
Fiscal policy and its role in economy and, in particular, in the economies of the 
Economic and Monetary Union can be discussed from the point of view of both 
Keynesian and anti-state  theories (especially such as monetarism and supply economy) 
as there are practical experiences of the reform concepts based on them (in the USA and 
Great Britain in the 80’s). In both countries they tended to diminish the role of the state in 
economy.
4  
From the theoretical point of view, Keynesian economics complies with the 
concept of an active state in the sphere of economic process regulation which executes 
the welfare state idea. In brief, the main contents of it can be quoted after A. Wojtyna:
5  
 
a)  the private sector is unstable by nature; 
b)  production is determined by joint aggregated demand while the supply factors are 
of minor importance; 
c)  adjustment processes in economy are long-term ones on account of wage and 
price rigidity; 
d)  inflation and unemployment are inter-changeable, at least in the short term; 
e)  the state should run an active economic policy based on discretional procedures 
and automatic stabilizers of economic situation; 
f)  fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy; 
g)  the prime objective of economic policy is to reduce unemployment. 
 
Thus, from the Keynesian point of view, fiscal policy is an essential stability factor of 
economic situation. Besides, the regulation range in economy is quite large while the 
regulatory market functions are limited. 
If we have a look at the outlined problem from the short-term point of view, then, 
theoretically, the rigid fiscal policy by virtue of adopting subject criteria of fiscal stability 
will limit the possibilities of its employment (as a discretional policy) for reviving the 
economy. However, attention must be drawn to the fact that the discretional policy 
effectiveness is very limited, which has been revealed by both theory and experience of 
the last decades of the 20
th century. 
For fiscal policy to be a good regulation instrument of economic processes means 
to be effective. Unfortunately there are a number of constraints to its effectiveness. First 
of all, for political and social reasons it is an inflexible policy on account of: 
6  
 
a)  fragmentation of economic information also this concerning economic subjects’ 
reactions (information constraints); 
b)  difficulty in attaining a parliamentary consensus concerning the changes in the 
budget deficit level and structure (the so-called operational constraints); 
c)  a long period of preparing and agreeing upon changes in the budget expenditures 
and taxes (the so-called time constraints); 
d)  social barriers in raising taxes or limiting state expenditures; 
                                                           
4 See: an interview with R. Barro in [Snowdon Vane, Wynarczyk, 1998, pp. 281-292]; on 
American economy see [Bieñkowski, 1995]. 
5 [See: Wojtyna, 1990, p. 56]. 
6  See [Mortimer-Lee, 2001].   5
e)  a specific quality of government expenditure - it is easy to increase it but difficult 
to reduce; 
f)  a political cycle inconsistent with the rational fiscal policy; 
 
The above reasons can cause that the government may not be able to react to an 
asymmetrical shock within the time required. Delayed fiscal activities can be inadequate 
to the economic situation in which they occur. The problem of limiting the scale of public 
investment in result of accepting the fiscal stability criteria is not so much an outcome of 
the lack of possibilities of increasing the budget deficit above 3% of GDP but of improper 
structure of budget expenditure. In most countries of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
it is the social objectives that prevail in expenditures and not public investment. 
The crisis of Keynes’ theory  connected with the 1970’s emergence of new 
phenomena in the capitalist economies was related to the development of the new anti-
state trends in economic theory, such as monetarism, neo-classical economy, new 
Austrian school, economic theory of politics, theory of public choice, supply side 
economics and theory of rational expectations. What is more, three of them, namely 
monetarism, supply side economics and the theory of rational expectations became the 
bases for the US doctrine of Raeganomics and its realization.
7 
The above mentioned anti-state theories in modern economics are related to the 
concept of the state with limited functions in economy, the one which formulates game 
rules in economy enabling the widest possible range of market regulation and controls 
their observing and whose economic policy is limited. The conclusions common to all the 
above mentioned anti-state theories can be summarised as follows:
8  
 
a)  insecurity and permanent disturbances are a significant feature of the economic 
process, information is scattered among a large number of units which have only 
fragmentary knowledge of economy; thus, in such conditions, the market is the 
best way of co-ordinating activities of particular economic subjects whereas the 
state cannot replace the market as an allocation mechanism as it does not possess 
indispensable information; 
b)  an active stabilizing policy in reality brings about  the results contrary to those 
intended, namely it destabilizes the economic system as it disturbs the natural 
game of market forces; besides, subordination of government activities to the 
electoral cycle also plays its role; the government creates the economic policy 
subordinated to the ultimate objective being victory in the elections, which also 
de-stabilizes economy. 
c)  demand side policy is ineffective due to the expectations of economic subjects; 
d)  expansive fiscal policy leads to a permanent budget deficit and public debt; this 
affects unfavourably the economic growth, among others through the occurrence  
of the so-called „crowding out effect” whose essence relies on the fact that the 
rise in state expenditure causes a compensatory fall of private consumption or 
investment;
9 the crowding out effect means ineffectiveness of fiscal policy. 
                                                           
7 [See: Bieńkowski, 1995, p. 109-121]. 
8 [See: Wojtyna, 1995, pp.53-98], [Hall, Taylor, 1997, pp. 529-535], [Bienkowski, 1995, p. 109-
121], see also: [Snowdon, Vane, Wynarczyk, 1998]. 
9 The mechanism of the crowding out effect is as follows: higher state expenditures increase 
production and income. Higher income increases the real cash resources. The higher real demand 
for money at stable supply of it leads to higher interest rates. In turn, higher interest rates crowd 
out consumption and investment and inhibit expansion. The crowding out effect is surrounded by 
numerous controversies. One distinguishes indirect and direct crowding out: transaction and 
portfolio crowding out. See also [Wojtyna, 1990, pp. 163-167].   6
e)  economy is basically stable and after an economic shock it returns to its natural 
level determined by the supply-side factors, however, due to the rigidity 
occurring in economy this return is not a long lasting one; 
f)  the state should run the economic policy based on stable rules and aimed at 
stimulating supply (among others through balancing the budget, low public debt, 
low taxes); economic policy of this type can, in the long run, affect fluctuations 
in the  size and duration of output, employment and inflation from the regular 
level following the influence of economic shocks on the economy. 
 
From the point of view of the above mentioned anti-state theories, fiscal policy 
should be oriented on fiscal objectives only. Moreover, in the supply-side economy it is 
assumed that at the moment of „fine tuning” the pro-supply factors include: tax and 
budget expenditure reduction as well as restoring the budget equilibrium and public debt 
reduction. 
Despite market imperfections manifested, among others, in the medium- and 
long-term stabilizing adjustments to changes caused by economic shocks, it can be 
concluded that fiscal policy need not be used on the large scale (as it is assumed in the 
Keynesian type economy) for stabilizing the economic situation and stimulating 
economic growth. There are other mechanisms of stabilizing economy after economic 
shocks (See: Table 1).   7
 
Table 1  
Fiscal policy and other mechanisms of economic shock absorption, stabilisation costs 
reduction, their effectiveness and constraints in the situation of monetary union 
Mechanism  Mechanism’s effect  Short-term effects  Medium- and long-term 
effects 
Limitations 
1  2 3 4  5 
Fiscal policy  Demand smoothing  Reducing unemployment 
by means of stimulating 
production and 
employment, increase in 
budget deficit and public 
debt 
 
1.Maintaining high budget 
deficit and public debt 
2. Higher taxes, lower 
economic growth and 
wealth;  
3. Higher interest rates; 
1.Low effectiveness in the 
conditions of supply shocks,  
2. Information, time and 




Demand smoothing  Reducing unemployment 




Negligible  1. No budget at the union 
level or insufficient budget; 
2.   No consent from all 
union countries to 




Adjusts labour force 
supply 
Negligible    1. Reduced unemployment; 
2. Adjusting wages to 
supply and demand; 
1. Labour market rigidity; 
2. Fixed costs of migration; 
3. Social protection; 
4. The level of housing 
market development; 
5. Differences in fiscal, social 
and legal systems between 
countries; 
6. Cultural differences 
7. Psychological factors; 
Mobility of capital  Movement of capital to 
economy or region of 
lower labour costs, 
restructuring of economic 
sectors 
Negligible  1. Increasing production 
and employment; 




1. Movement of capital does 
not necessarily match the 
needs of countries or regions; 
2. Tax competitiveness; 
3. Social and political 
barriers; 









2. Increased production and 
employment; 




1.Trade Unions activities; 
2. Restrictive labour law  and 
collective labour agreements; 
3. Social barriers and 
possibility of strikes; 




Negligible  1. Allocation effects 
2. Acceleration of 




2. Rigidity of markets and 
enterprise behaviour in 
establishing prices; 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 




demand and price 
adjustments. Stimulates 
economic growth; 








1. Counteraction by 
economic interest groups; 
2. Politicians’ conservatism if 




Reduction of labour costs 
through reduction of  
administration and social 
protection costs pertaining 
to employment; flexible 




Negligible  1.Reduction of enterprise 
costs; 
2. Increased tendency to 




4. Speeding up adjustment 
processes 
1. Social and political 
barriers; 
2. Strong trade unions; 
3. Possibility of strikes; 
Reduction of taxes 
including the 
direct ones and 
simplifying the tax 
system 
Stimulation of  economic 
activity, capital 
accumulation, economic 
growth and employment; 
 
Temporary fall in budget 
revenues and increased 
budget deficit; 
1.Increased savings and 
capital accumulation; 
2. Increased investment 
and employment; 
3. Accelerated economic 
and GDP growth; 
4. Increased 
competitiveness of 
enterprises and economy; 
5. Increased budget 
revenues; 
6. Reduction of grey 
economy; 
1. Social and political 
barriers; 
2. High budget deficit and 
public debt at the moment of 
initiating the tax reform; 
Reduction of 
budget deficit and 
public debt by 
reducing 
expenditure 
Diminishing the crowding 
out effect; 
Stimulation of the long-
term economic growth; 
Creating a possibility of a 
reform and tax reduction; 
Temporary decrease in the 
economic growth; 
1. Increased economic 
stability; 
2. Higher tendency to work 
due to less social 
protection; 
3. Lower interest rates; 
4. Increased private 
investment due to the 
limited crowding out 
effect; 
1.Social and political 
barriers; 
Source: [Bukowski, 2003]. 
 
The condition, however, is a sufficient level of economy’s de-regulation which 
means growth of market flexibility (including this of the labour market) as well as price 
and wage flexibility and taking off the burden of high taxes and excessive economic 
regulation from enterprises. The de-regulation scope enabling activities of market-related 
self-adjustment processes will determine the scope of indispensable state activities by 
means of monetary and fiscal policies (as the so-called mix policy) including the scope of 
employing fiscal policy instruments. Thus, it can be concluded that the monetary union 
economies should remain de-regulated, which means a lower budget, lower public debt, 
lower tax burden (lower ultimate interest rate in the case of indirect taxes and lower 
indirect taxes), a more flexible labour market, more flexible prices and wages. If we 
follow the conclusions of anti-state economists that fiscal policy is ineffective or little 
effective as an instrument of economic stabilization, then de-regulation and limiting the 
role of the state in economy while creating the conditions for natural market-related   
adjustment mechanisms occurrence could enable the monetary union countries cost 
minimalization (stability losses) pertaining to the creation of the common monetary area, 
both in the short- and long-term. Monetary union economies would approach the criteria 
of the optimum monetary area.   9
Table 1 shows that effects of most adjustment mechanisms appear only after a 
medium- or long term. The fiscal policy effects in the form of economic growth 
stimulation can appear after a short period but in the medium- or long term its effects can 
be unfavourable for economic growth. 
In view of negative effects of the high budget deficit and public debt for the long-
term economic growth, maintaining fiscal stabilisation criteria adopted in the Stability 
and Growth Pact is fully justified. They discipline fiscal policy of individual countries 
and are the instrument of their co-ordination. First of all, they have become a barrier for 
the fiscal aspirations of politicians aiming at winning electorate in subsequent electoral 
campaigns by giving more privileges, which is immediately reflected by the increase in 
budget expenditure. Political groups usually create economic policy from the point of 
view of maintaining power and authority for one or two  terms. They do not tend to create 
policy from the point of view of a long-term economic growth. 
On the other hand, the requirement of meeting fiscal stability criteria can be one 
of the incentives for structural reforms in the economies of the monetary union member 
countries and those which are planning to join them. These reforms should aim at de-
regulation of economy and creating conditions for more effective market-related 
adjustment mechanisms. 
Thus, instead of suggesting the abolition or mitigation of fiscal stability criteria, 
one should consider acceleration of structural reforms and possibly making the Stability 
and Growth Pact mechanisms more effective. In the case of the Pact, it refers to the 
creation of an early precaution mechanism which would prevent particular economic and 
monetary union member countries from exceeding the reference values. Attempts to 




3.  Fiscal stability problems in selected countries (Germany, France, Portugal) 
against the background of convergence processes 
 
The countries which set up the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 fulfilled 
nominal requirements of the convergence in 1998, including the requirement of fiscal 
stability. 
The problem which occurred in some countries was meeting the convergence 
requirement pertaining to the public debt (See Table 2). As the data in Table 2 indicates, 
only three Euroland countries: Belgium, Italy and Greece did not meet the requirement 
concerning the public debt. 
                                                           
10 See, among others [Eijffinger, 2002].   10
Table 2 
Convergence criteria and meeting them by  Euroland countries in 1998. 
Country/criterion Inflation  budget  deficit  public debt  long-term interest rate 
Max. value.  0,7+1,5=2,2%  -3,0%  60,0%  4,6+2,0=6,6% 
Belgium 0,9  -0,9  119,8  4,7 
Germany 0,6  -2,1  60,7  4,6 
Greece 4,5  -2,5  105,5  8,5 
Spain 1,8  -2,6  64,7  4,8 
France 0,7  -2,7  59,7  4,6 
Ireland 2,1  2,2  55,0  4,8 
Italy 2,0  -2,8  116,2  4,8 
Luxembourg 1,0  3,2 6,4  4,7 
Netherlands 1,8  -0,7  66,8  4,6 
Austria 0,5  -2,2  63,9  4,7 
Portugal 2,2  -2,3  55,3  5,0 
Finland 1,4  1,3  48,8  4,8 
Euroland  (12) 1,2  -2,2 73,3  4,8 
 
Source: European Economy No 2/2002.Economic forecasts, Spring 2002; European Economy No 
72/2001; OECD Economic Outlook.Economics, Volume 2001/2, No 70 , December; OECD 




In the following years some convergence requirements were departed from by 
some Euroland countries (see; Table 3). Still, the convergence criteria concerning the 
public debt have not been met by: Belgium, Greece, Italy. Moreover, the public debt 
exceeded the border value of 60% GDP in Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany 
(in 1999). 
In the years 2000-2001 the situation deteriorated even more. In 2001, the 
convergence requirements were fully satisfied by such countries as: Germany, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland. 
On the other hand, Portugal and Ireland exceeded the inflation ratio, Austria and 
Italy exceeded the public debt ratio, Greece exceeded both public debt and inflation 
ratios, Belgium exceeded the public debt ratio. What is more, Portugal exceeded by 1.2 
percentage points the allowed share of public debt in GDP. The budget deficit increased 
also in Germany and Italy.   11
Table 3 
Convergence criteria and meeting them by  Euroland countries in  1999 and 2001 
Year 1999  2001 
Country/criterio
n 
Inflation budget  deficit  public debt long-term 
interest rate 
Inflation budget  deficit public  debt Long-term  interest 
rate 
Max. index  0,6+1,5=2,1
% 
-3,0% 60,0%  4,6+2=6,6%  2,1+1,5=3,6
% 
-3% 60,0%  5,1+2,0=7,1% 
Belgium  1,1 -0,7  116,4 4,8  2,4 0,3 108,5  5,1 
Germany 0,6  -1,4  61,1  4,5 2,4  -2,8  59,8  4,8 
Greece 2,1  -1,8  104,6  6,5 3,7  -1,9  107,0  5,3 
Spain 2,2  -1,2  63,4  4,7  3,2  -0,1  56,9  5,1 
France 0,6  -1,6  58,8  4,6  1,8  -1,6  56,8  5,0 
Ireland  2,5  2,1  50,1 4,6  4,0 1,1 36,8  4,9 
Italy 1,7  -1,8  114,5  4,8  2,3  -2,6  109,5  5,2 
Luxembourg  1,0    4,7  6,0 4,7 2,4  6,4 5,6  5,0 
Netherlands  2,0  1,0  63,2 4,6  5,2 0,1 52,8  5,0 
Austria  0,7  -2,1  64,7 4,7  2,3 0,3 67,3  5,1 
Portugal 2,2  -2,0  55,0  4,8  4,4  -4,2  55,6 5,2 
Finland  1,3  1,8  46,9 4,7  2,7 5,1 43,8  5,0 
Euroland (12)  1,1  -1,3  72,3  4,7  2,5  -1,6  69,2  5,0 
Source: European Economy No 2/2002.Economic forecasts, Spring 2002; European Economy No 
72/2001; OECD Economic Outlook.Economics, Volume 2001/2, No 70 , December; OECD 
Economic Outlook. Economics, Volume 2002/1, No 71, June; Annual Report, European Central 
Bank, 2002. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the 1998 changes carried out in Euroland countries 
and aiming at satisfying the convergence criteria are not stable. It is a significant 
weakness of Euroland economies confirmed by the research carried out, among others, by 
M. Demertzis, A.H. Hallet, O. Rummel. According to them, the growing convergence 
indicated by fulfilling the Maastricht convergence criteria in the 1990s resulted rather 
from applying appropriate instruments of economic policy than natural convergence 
processes in the field of economic adjustment and structures. They emphasise also that 
although politics helped to create conditions for the Economic and Monetary Union 
creation, since then the whole project has depended on the effect of political changes.
11  
Maintaining, and in some countries returning to the values defined by 
convergence criteria, requires thorough structural changes. Development of the Economic 
and Monetary Union requires a higher degree of real convergence.  This is indicated also 
by problems with maintaining the budget deficit to GDP ratio below 3% in Germany, 
Portugal and France. The budget deficit in Germany in 2002 amounted to 3.6% of GDP 
and in France to 3.2% of GDP. Portugal already had a budget deficit of 4.2% of GDP in 
2001 (See; Table 5). 
The reasons for such a situation can be traced back to the economic cycle. 
Recession appeared in 2001 and in most countries it was revealed by a significant fall in 
economic growth (See: Table 4). 
                                                           
11  See: [Demertzis, Hallet, Rummel, 2000].   12
 
Table 4. 
Gross Domestic Product in Euroland and EU countries in fixed prices in 1995 (annual change 
in percentages 
Country/year  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 
Belgium  2,8 1,9 1,6 -1,5 3,0 2,6 1,2 3,4 2,4 2,7 3,9 1,0  1,1 
Germany  5,7 5,0 2,2 -1,1 2,3 1,7 0,8 1,4 2,1 1,6 3,0 0,6  0,8 
Greece 0,0  3,1  0,7  -1,6 2,0 2,1 2,4 3,5 3,1 3,4 4,1 4,1  3,7 
Spain  3,8 2,5 0,9 -1,0 2,4 2,8 2,4 3,9 4,3 4,0 4,1 2,8  2,1 
France  2,6 1,0 1,5 -0,9 2,1 1,7 1,1 1,9 3,1 2,9 3,2 2,0  1,6 
Ireland  7,6 1,9 3,3 2,7 5,8 9,7 7,7  10,7  8,6 9,8  10,7  6,8  3,5 
Italy  2,0 1,4 0,8 -0,9 2,2 2,9 1,1 2,0 1,8 1,6 2,9 1,8  1,4 
Luxembourg  2,2 6,1 4,5 8,7 4,2 3,8 2,9 7,3 5,0 7,5 8,5 5,1  2,9 
Netherlands  4,1 2,3 2,0 0,8 3,2 2,3 3,0 3,8 4,1 3,9 3,9 1,1  1,5 
Austria  4,7 3,3 2,3 0,4 2,6 1,6 2,0 1,3 3,3 2,8 3,2 1,0  1,2 
Portugal  4,4 2,3 2,5 -1,1 2,2 2,9 3,7 3,8 3,8 3,0 3,3 1,8  1,5 
Finland  0,0 -6,3  -3,3  -1,1 4,0 3,8 4,0 6,3 5,3 4,2 5,7 0,7  1,6 
Euroland  (12)  3,5 2,4 1,5 -0,8 2,4 2,3 1,5 2,4 2,8 2,6 3,4 1,6  1,4 
European  Union  (15)  2,9 1,7 1,2 -0,4 2,8 2,4 1,7 2,6 2,8 2,5 3,4 1,7  1,5 
Source: European Economy No 72/2001; European Economy No 2/2002. Economic forecasts, 
Spring 2002; European Economy No 4/2002.  
 
However, limiting our discussion to the effect of changes in the economic 
situation on the budget deficit of these countries would be an oversimplification. The 
causes go deeper in the very economies of these countries and the nature of their short- 
and long-term fiscal policies. It must also be taken into account in what way the said 
countries managed to meet the fiscal stability criterion in the second phase of the 
Economic and Monetary Union creation. 
In most countries which are now the members of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (except Luxembourg) the processes of adjustment to fiscal stabilisation 
requirements were similar. These countries made their fiscal policies stricter. In the years 
1996-1999 they reduced budget spending. However, in most cases this type of policy 
encountered social and political barriers, the more so, because there were no 
accompanying reforms in such areas as social security, health protection or education. 
Therefore, in order to reduce budget deficits it was necessary to raise taxes, 
administration fees and social security contributions. 
12 Consequently, budget deficits 
were significantly reduced (See: Table 5). 
 
                                                           
12 See: [Keis, 2001].   13
Table 5 
Budget deficit in Euroland countries, the EU and United States (state sector deficit), % GDP 
Country/year 1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20002001  2002 
Belgium -6,7  -7,4 -8,0 -7,3 -5,0 -4,3 -3,8 -1,9 -0,9 -0,7 0,0 0,3 0,0
Germany -2,0  -3,0 -2,5 -3,1 -2,4 -3,3 -3,4 -2,7 -2,1 -1,4 1,5 -2,8 -3,6
Greece -15,9  -11,4 -12,6 -13,6 -9,9 -10,2 -7,4 -4,0 -2,5 -1,8 -0,9 -1,9 -1,2
Spain -4,2  -4,3 -4 -6,7 -6,1 -6,6 -4,9 -3,2 -2,6 -1,2 -0,3 -0,1 -0,1
France -2,1  -2,5 -4,2 -6,0 -5,5 -5,6 -4,1 -3,0 -2,7 -1,6 -1,3 -1,6 -3,2
Ireland -2,8  -2,9 -3 -2,7 -2,0 -2,2 -0,1 0,7 2,2 2,1 4,7 1,1 -0,3
Italy -11,0  -10,0 -9,5 -9,4 -9,1 -7,6 -7,1 -2,7 -2,8 -1,8 -0,6 -2,6 -2,3
Luxembourg 4,7  1,4 2,6 5,0 4,6 3,3 2,5 3,6 3,2 4,7 5,3 6,4 2,6
Netherlands -5,7  -3,2 -4,4 -3,6 -4,2 -4,2 -1,8 -1,1 -0,7 1,0 2,2 0,1 -1,1
Austria -2,4  -3,0 -2,0 -4,2 -5 -5,2 -3,8 -1,7 -2,2 -2,1 -1,1 0,3 -0,6
Portugal -4,9  -5,9 -2,9 -5,9 -5,9 -4,6 -4,0 -2,6 -2,3 -2,0 -1,6 -4,2 -2,7
Finland 5,3  -1,1 -5,6 -7,3 -5,7 -3,7 -3,2 -1,5 1,3 1,8 6,7 5,1 4,7
Euroland (12)  -4,5  -4,7 -4,9 -5,6 -5,0 -5,0 -4,3 -2,6 -2,2 -1,3 0,3 -1,6 -2,2
European Union 
(15) 
-4,0 -4,4 -5,2 -6,3 -5,6 -5,3 -4,3 -2,5 -1,6 -0,7 0,6 -0,8 -1,3
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Economics, Volume 2001/2, No 70 , December; OECD 
Economic Outlook. Economics, Volume 2002/1, No 71, June; Annual Report, European Central 
Bank, 2002. 
 
This was reflected by the fiscalism indicator growth, i.e. the share of taxes, 
parafiscal fees and social security contributions in GDP (See: Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
Fiscalism indicators (share of taxes and parafiscal fees as well as social security contributions 
in GDP (%) 
Country/year  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 
Belgium  44,1 44,4 43,9 46,0 46,2 46,0 46,6 46,9 47,3 47,2 47,0 46,6  46,1
Germany  41,8 41,2 42,5 43,0 43,5 43,0 43,9 43,7 43,8 44,5 44,4 43,0  42,9
Greece 31,6 32,5 33,3  34,5 36,1 44,5 44,9 46,9 48,1 50,2 49,9 49,8  49,7
Spain  37,5 38,3 39,9 40,5 39,0 37,4 38,1 38,1 38,2 38,2 38,4 38,5  38,6
France  47,4 47,6 47,5 47,9 48,2 48,0 49,7 49,7 49,6 50,5 50,0 49,6  49,2
Ireland  36,7 37,8 38,2 38,1 38,7 35,4 35,7 34,8 34,0 35,0 34,7 34,2  33,9
Italy  41,3 42,2 42,9 46,0 43,7 43,5 44,2 45,8 44,5 44,9 44,1 43,4  43,1
Luxembourg  45,7 44,3 45,8 48,8 46,7 46,2 45,8 44,8 44,3 45,4 44,8 42,5  41,8
Netherlands  43,7 46,3 45,6 46,3 43,4 43,6 43,8 43,3 42,7 43,7 43,7 42,1  42,2
Austria  46,2 46,7 48,4 49,0 47,6 47,3 48,1 48,0 47,9 47,3 46,4 46,9  46,6
Portugal  34,6 36,1 39,6 38,1 36,8 36,6 37,4 37,4 37,9 38,9 40,2 40,3  40,5
Finland  49,6 51,6 52,0 51,8 51,8 50,6 50,9 49,8 49,4 48,6 50,3 48,1  47,6
Euroland  (12)  42,6 42,8 43,5 44,7 44,2 44,0 44,9 45,1 44,8 45,4 45,1 44,2  44,0
European Union 
(15) 
42,7 43,0 43,3 44,0 43,6 43,4 44,2 44,5 44,5 45,0 44,8 44,2  44,0
Source: European Economy No 2/2002. Economic forecasts, Spring 2002; European Economy No 
72/2001; OECD Economic Outlook. Economics, Volume 2001/2, No 70 , December; OECD 
Economic Outlook. Economics, Volume 2002/1, No 71, June.    14
 
It is not accidental that the problems with maintaining fiscal stability occurred in 
Germany and France. Both countries share certain features in common: 
 
a)  they realize the concept of the protective state; 
b)  they offer social privileges which mean large budget expenditure; 
c)  they have complicated tax systems of progressive character and excessively 
high tax rates; 
d)  they represent fiscalism in economic policy; 
e)  the share of expenditure on social purposes, social security, health protection  
in budget expenditure and GDP is high (in Germany - 30.1% of GDP, in 
France - 32.2% of GDP in 2001).
13 
f)  their social security, health protection and unemployment benefit systems are 
inefficient, ineffective and costly; 
g)  they tend to over-regulate the market (also the labour market); 
h)  red-tape rules in economy; 
i) they try to achieve budget equilibrium through raising taxes; 
 
In both countries, in the years 2001-2002, their fiscal policies were relaxed due to 
recession and increase in public spending especially on social purposes. 
  Portugal, however, is a typical example of a country where economic growth was 
stimulated in the last few years by consumption demand which in turn was stimulated by 
a bank credit. In the years 1997-1998 Portugal was the sixth country in Europe of the 
fastest GDP growth (following Ireland, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands). Yet, in Ireland the economic growth resulted from investment and 
technological development whereas in Portugal it was mainly stimulated by consumption 
demand. It was also stimulated by expansive fiscal policy in the years 1999-2000.The 
lack of deeper reforms in public finance caused, first of all, by a drop in domestic and 
foreign demand led to a high budget deficit in 2001. 
  Summing up, the reasons for current fiscal problems in Euroland which are 
particularly well seen in Germany, Portugal and France, should be sought mainly among 




4.  Prospects of fiscal policy and economic growth in the Economic and Monetary 
Union 
 
  The future of the EU monetary union, a long-term economic growth and fiscal 
stability will depend on deep reforms in the economies of individual member countries. 
The reforms in question should aim at de-regulation and greater flexibility of the 
economies which should let them approach the criteria of the optimum monetary area. 
The most important thing is to introduce such institutional and structural changes which 
will enable more efficient functioning of adjustment mechanisms in restoring economic 
equilibrium and, on the other hand, will foster attainment of a high degree of real 
convergence in the economies of the monetary union  member states. 
Among the trends of such structural and institutional transformations are: 
 
a)  a deep reform of public finance covering: the change in budget spending structure 
(reducing the so-called rigid expenditure by  abandoning the concept of the 
                                                           
13  See: European Economy, No 3/2002, p. 168, p. 184.   15
protective state, giving up some public goods to the benefit of private goods, 
giving up public aid for enterprises and subsidies for farmers, permanent 
equilibrium of the budget), reducing tax burden for enterprises and physical 
persons (by simplifying tax systems and lowering both direct and indirect taxes); 
b)  de-regulation of labour market aiming at more flexible wages, greater freedom of 
concluding contracts of employment, abandoning social security burden, 
reducing the trade unions role in the labour market; 
c)  privatisation of the state sector enterprises and de-monopolisation and de-
regulation of markets (including agricultural market); 
d)  departing in economic policy from a short-term intervention on the side of 
demand and basing the economic policy on long-term and stable rules; in short 
term the economic policy should strengthen adjustment processes, which, after 
shocks, should bring the economy back to the normal level of production, GDP 
and inflation. 
e)  increasing the scope of fiscal policy co-ordination which should embrace a 
greater harmonization of rules of fiscal intervention in the situation of economic 
shocks and long-term rules of fiscal policy. 
 
Some national reforms are connected with reforms at the EU level, for instance 
revision of objectives, guidelines and instruments, reforms of the common agricultural or 
industrial policy. 
These changes are particularly significant for the peripheral countries of the 




6.  Conclusions for the new EU members 
 
The monetary union can be joined by countries of different levels of economic 
development which are likely to suffer from inflation and are at different levels of 
integration with other countries. Thus, an essential problem is the relationship between 
the dominating and peripheral countries of the monetary union. 
  The group of dominating countries includes the countries which are strongly 
integrated, which means they make up an integrated, unified market, their inter-branch 
exchange is high, their economies are complementary and the convergence level in the 
fields of inflation, budget, public debt and economic infrastructure is equally high. We 
can mention here Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. The second group of countries are the peripheral ones which 
are just integrating to the dominating countries. In this case the convergence level with 
the economies of the dominating countries is low and it needs some time before it grows. 
Besides, some of these countries can be characterised by a significantly lower economic 
development (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece). The peripheral countries of high 
economic development (Sweden, Finland, Great Britain) are close to the dominating ones 
and are likely to enter the dominating group after a period of structural and institutional 
adjustments. 
Peripheral countries are particularly prone to the so-called asymmetric shocks. 
The monetary policy in the situation of the monetary union is formed on the basis of 
signals coming from the dominating countries which make up the main part of the 
monetary union area. 
  If we accept that the dominating country economies achieved a higher level of 
mutual integration (e.g. a higher level of structural and economic adjustment) than those 
of peripheral countries to the dominating ones, then, the likelihood of problems connected   16
with asymmetric shocks for peripheral countries is very high. In the situation when it is 
impossible to apply a monetary policy, including exchange rate and interest rate policies, 
they are doomed to apply fiscal policy only, which can turn out to be quite ineffective. 
The costs of such policy may be equally high. 
The countries which in 2003 signed the accession treaty (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Cyprus) are 
characterised by a lower economic development than the average  in the EU (except 
Slovenia). Also their level of integration with the EU countries is relatively low. Thus, 
they will increase the number of the peripheral countries. 
  In the peripheral countries inflation is quite likely, among others, due to the 
Samuelson-Balassy effect.
14 This effect can make it difficult to achieve or maintain a low 
inflation level at the average level of inflation in the monetary union. The effect is not 
visible in highly developed economies where the pace of economic growth is relatively 
slow. It is, however, common in the countries developing fast where the processes of real 
convergence are still underway. 
In the economies of these countries labour productivity grows fast in the tradable 
goods sector, exchanged on the international scale. Labour productivity is higher here 
than in the sector of non-tradable goods. Besides, an increase in labour productivity in the 
tradable goods sector is connected with the tendency towards a wage growth in this 
sector. However, the differences in wages between exchangeable and non-exchangeable 
goods sectors cannot last forever. Wages in the non-exchangeable goods sector start to 
grow despite a lower labour productivity. Consequently, because a wage increase leads to 
higher production costs, the prices of non-exchangeable goods grow. This means higher 
inflation in the non-exchangeable goods sector. Thus, inflation rises. 
  If there is no monetary policy, the government of a peripheral country can only 
apply a restrictive fiscal policy counteracting inflation by limiting consumption demand. 
This, in turn, can result in a lower pace of economic growth in both, short- and long term 
and can lower public wealth in the long term. The occurrence of a demand shock will be 
combined with the necessity of applying an expansive fiscal policy which will be 
reflected in a higher budget deficit and public debt. In the case of supply shocks, fiscal 
policy is ineffective in the long run.
15  
  As it is emphasised by W. Siwiñski, the lack of possibilities of reacting through 
changes in monetary policy, separately for individual countries within the monetary 
union and the lack of an exchange rate mechanism cause that the adjustment processes 
reacting to disturbances will depend largely on the flexibility of the markets of goods and 
services and production factors, including also the labour market.
16  
  Thus, on the one hand, the peripheral countries characterised by lower economic 
development and lower integration level to the countries of the integrating area can 
benefit from general opportunities available to everyone; on the other hand, however,  
they can pay a high price in adjustment costs after the asymmetric economic shocks have 
occurred due to the lack of monetary policy typical of their economies.
17  
  For this reason, accession countries should not be quick in making a decision 
about joining the full Economic and Monetary Union. Such decisions should be preceded 
by thorough structural and institutional reforms. First, appropriate conditions must be 
created for effective functioning of adjustment mechanisms including de-regulation of 
economy (also product and labour markets). Market mechanisms will take the burden of 
adjustment to economic shocks where there is no monetary policy on the national level 
and effectiveness of fiscal policy is seriously restricted. The reform of public finance is of 
                                                           
14 See: [Samuelson, 1964], [Balassa, 1964]. 
15 See: [Bukowski, 2001]. 
16 See: [Siwiński, 2000]. 
17  See also [Wagner, 2001].   17
particular importance. Instead of applying all possible means of attaining budget 
equilibrium aiming at satisfying the fiscal stabilisation criteria, the accession countries 
should plan their activities rather which would lead to a significant budget reduction by 
means of budget spending reduction to absolute minimum and significant reduction of 
taxes and simplification of the tax system (some countries, like Estonia, Latvia have 
already done it), reforming the social security and health protection systems. The reform 
of public finance should aim at eliminating the mechanisms which would increase public 
spending under political pressures. 
  Satisfying the fiscal stability criteria should result from a relatively stable 
macroeconomic stabilisation and effectiveness of market-related adjustment mechanisms. 
   18
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